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BRADWELL v. STATE OF ILLINOIS 
by 
Norma Glass 
During the September Term 1869, Myra Bradwell, thirty-eight-
year-old wife of Cook County Judge James Bradwell, applied to the 
Illinois Supreme Court for a license to practice law in the courts of 
this state. She was denied admittance to the Bar because, as a 
married woman, she "would be bound neither by her express 
contracts nor by those implied contracts which it is the policy of th e 
law to create between attorney and client."1 
At the time of Mrs. Bradwell's application, the State of Illinois 
enforced the Common Law of England. Common Law regarding the 
status of married women was based upon, "the biblical idea that at 
marriage the male and female became one flesh. Under the law they 
become one person and that person [is] the husband."2 Until 187 4, 
when Illinois Statutes were revised, women were legally barred from 
entering into contracts. 
Mrs. Bradwell was notified of the court's decision in a letter from 
the Illinois Supreme Court reporter. Her response was to file a bri ef 
in which she cited several cases opposing the court' s vi ews in her 
case, and reports of admissions of women to law schools and medi ca l 
colleges in other areas of the country. She accused the court of 
denying to married women the right to support themselves. Bradwell 
also cited Article IV, section two of the United States Constitution, 
and the privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. By taking this action, she in effect forc ed the hand of 
the court, which again denied her a license to practi ce law, but thi s 
time not because she was a married woman, but instead because SHE 
WAS A WOMAN. 
Citing history, the Constitution, Illinois Statutes, and God as <i 
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basis for its decision, the Court argued that women were unknown as 
attorneys in England, and "a proposition that a woman should enter 
the courts of Westminster Hall in that capacity, or as a barrister, 
would have created hardly less astonishment than that she should 
ascend the bench of bishops, or be elected to a seat in the House of 
Commons. "3 
As to Mrs. Bradwell's claims regarding the denial of her 
constitutional rights, the court found as follows: 1) Although Mrs. 
Bradwell was born in Vermont, she had resided in Illinois for many 
years, making her a citizen of this state, and ineligible for the rights of 
Article IV.24; and 2) the right to practice law in state courts is not a 
privilege or immunity of a United States citizen, within the context of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.5 
The final point of the Illinois court's argument rested on the 
statutes of the State. The court held that even though Mrs. Bradwell 
had met the State Statute's requirements for a certificate of 
examination, signed by a Circuit Judge and the State's Attorney of 
the circuit in which she lived, and had a certificate of good moral 
character from a county court, she still was unqualified because she 
could not meet one of the two limitations placed on the court by the 
state legislature when determining who should be awarded a license 
to practice law: No person should be admitted to the practice of law 
who was not intended by the state legislature to be admitted. In this 
regard the Illinois court argued that "God designed the sexes to 
occupy different spheres of action, and that it belonged to men to 
make, apply, and execute the laws, was regarded as an almost 
axiomatic truth."6 Thus, the court held that as a result of all the 
reasons stated, including the intentions of God, it was impossible that 
the state legislature had ever intended to have the Court issue 
licenses for the practice of law to women. 
Upon hearing the judgement of the Illinois Supreme Court, Mrs. 
Bradwell said: 
----~~-=---
What the decision of the Supreme Court of the 
United States in the Dred Scott Case was as to the 
rights of Negroes as citizens of the United States, this 
decision is to the political rights of women of Illinois-
annihilation. 7 
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In response to the court' s statement regarding the intentions of the 
Creator, she printed in her Chicaf.?o L eRal News: 
... one thing 'Ne [The Legal News] do claim-that woman 
has a right to think and act as an individual-believing 
that if the Great Father had intended it to be otherwise, 
he would have placed Eve in a cage and given Adam the 
key.8 
Myra Bradwell was determined to achieve what she considered to 
be simple justice, and the decision of the Illinois court only served to 
spur her to further action. She took her case to the United States 
Supreme Court, where it was heard on a writ of error in December 
1872. She was represented by Senator Matt H. Carpenter of 
Wisconsin, a family friend and well-known constitutional lawyer. It is 
interesting to note that Carpenter also served as counsel in one of the 
Slaughter House cases that came before the Court at approximately 
the same time as the Bradwell case, and presented similar 
arguments. 9 
The Slauf{hter House cases were argued before the Supreme Court 
approximately two weeks after the Bradwell case, but the Court 
handed down the decision on the Slauf{hter House cases one day 
before the Bradwell decision. Leslie Friedman Goldstein has 
observed that the record of the proceedings of the Illinois Supreme 
Court in the Bradwell case was sketchy, and that the State of Illinois 
neglected to send counsel to represent its side before the United 
States Supreme Court, considering the case too trivial to bother with. 
Goldstein suggests that the Court may have reversed the order of the . 
cases because it wanted to use a case with more complete records, 
knowing it would make constitutional history.IO The actual reasons 
for the Supreme Court reversal of the order of the two cases was more 
than likely that the Slauf{hter House cases involved far more 
politically significant matters than the Bradwell case and that, once 
the Slauf{hter House cases were decided, the Bradwell case would 
become relatively simple to decide. Hence, the Slauf{hter House cases 
were decided prior to the Bradwell case, establishing the first official 
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court held for state's 
rights in the Slauf{hter House cases, establishing the concept of dual 
citizenship (state privileges and immunities and federal privileges 
-
and immunities). 
In Bradwell v. State of Illinois, Mr. Justice Miller delivered the 
opinion of the Court, upholding the Illinois Supreme Court ruling on 
every point. The only dissent was that of Mr. Chief Justice Chase. 
With the precedent established the day before in the Slaughter House 
cases, the Court found little difficulty in saying the right to practice 
law was not a privilege of United States citizenship, but rather a 
privilege to be administered by the laws of the states. 
It is intriguing that in the Slaughter House cases, whose arguments 
were almost identical to those of the Bradwell case, four Ju stices had 
dissented, while only one day later three of the four dissenters 
concurred with the majority in a similar decision. It appears that, 
because the Bradwell case involved a woman attempting to enter the 
sanctum sanctorum of men, everything objected to the previous day 
had become null and void. 
Senator Carpenter prepared a most convincing case for Mrs. 
Bradwell, placing a great deal of emphasis on the privileges and 
immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. He stated that if 
no state can make a law to truncate the privileges of a citizen, it must 
follow that the privileges of all citizens must be the same. He then 
continued by saying: 
It is evident that there are certain 'privileges and 
immunities' which belong to a citizen of the United 
States as such; otherwise it would be nonsense for the 
fourteenth amendment to prohibit a state from abridg-
ing them.11 
Carpenter continued to build his case by arguing: 
... the profession of the law, like the clerical profession 
and that of medicine, is an avocation open to every 
citizen of the United States. And while the legislature 
may prescribe qualifications for entering upon this 
pursuit, they cannot, under the guise of fixing qualifica-
tions, exclude a class of citizens from admission to the 
Bar.12 
In the Slaughter House cases, Justice Bradley's opinion spoke of 
the privileges to which American citizens were entitled. "Included in 
the bundle of national privileges and immunities, in Bradley's view, 
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was 'the right of any citizen to follow whatever lawful employment he 
chooses to adopt (submitting himself to all lawful regulations ... ).' "13 
In Myra Bradwell's case, Justice Bradley again spoke of privileges 
and immunities regarding employment. On that occasion however, he 
put conditions on those rights, which did not appear in his Slaw?hter 
House opinion: 
The humane movements of modern society, which 
have for their object the multiplication of avenues for 
woman's advancement, and of occupations adapted to 
her condition and sex, have my heartiest concurrence. 
But I am not prepared to say that it is one of her 
fundamental rights and privileges to be admitted into 
every office and position, including those which require 
highly special qualifications and demanding special 
responsibilities. In the nature of things it is not every 
citizen of every age, sex and condition that is qualified 
for every calling and position.14 
By focusing on some of Bradley's words and phrases, it is possible 
to conceptualize what his beliefs were regarding the upgrading of 
women's rights. The phrase "occupations adapted to her condition 
and sex" is one example expressing his position regarding just how 
much the new rights should allow women to achieve. Woman, in 
Justice Bradley's opinion, should be allowed to have an occupation, 
but the scope of her aspirations must be limited. Viewed in the 
context of 1982, one must ask what is the special condition of woman 
and what is so special or different about her sex, making her ineligible 
to meet the "highly special qualifications" or "demanding special 
responsibilities" of particular professions? Today the answer would 
have to be: nothing. But in 1872 the opinions of both the Illinois 
Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court were not 
unusual. Under the Common Law of England which was enforced at 
the time, married women were legally invested with nearly as few 
rights as Negroes. It would take a rare man to judge women's suffrage 
objectively in 1872. 
There was only one Justice on the Court, Chief Justice Chase, who 
was able to adjudicate with any objectivity in the Bradwell case and 
fully accept the implications of his dissent in the Slaughter House 
cases. Unfortunately, Chief Justice Chase dissented without opinion 
in the Bradwell case, and dissents without opinion carry very little 
weight. It takes little imagination, however, to figure out the 
procedure of his logic. The previous day he had concurred with a 
dissent that argued: 
'Equality of rights, among citizens in the pursuit of the 
ordinary avocations of life .. . with exemptions from all 
disparaging and partial enactments .. .is the distinguish-
ing privilege of all citizens of the United States.' 
Because the first clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
granted citizenship to 'all persons' born in the United 
States, and because women were clearly persons, the 
validity of Mrs. Bradwell's claim would seem to be the 
obvious conclusion.15 
Apart from his decision to voice a dissent with opinion, Chief 
Justice Chase clearly lacked the support of his brethren in the 
Bradwell case. The Supreme Court of the United States held that the 
judgement of the Illinois Supreme Court be affirmed, upholding the 
ruling in the Slauf?hter House cases. The Court agreed, as Justice 
Bradley had said in his decision, that "it is the prerogative of the 
legislature to prescribe regulations founded on nature, reason, and 
experience for the due admission of qualified persons to professions 
and callings demanding special skill and confidence."16 The 
admittance of a woman to the Bar in Illinois would have to wait until 
1873. 
The highest Court in the land may have denied Myra Bradwell the 
right to be an attorney, but it was unable to keep her from fighting for 
women's rights or assisting other women in their struggle to achieve 
recognition according to their ability. As a result of Mrs. Bradwell's 
efforts, a bill was passed by the Illinois Legislature in March 1872, 
providing that "no person could be precluded or debarred from 
employment, except military, on account of sex." On June 4, 1873, 
Alta M. Hulett, a young woman encouraged by Mrs. Bradwell, 
became the first woman in Illinois admitted to the Bar.17 When 
Justice C.B. Lawrence who had handed down the original Illinois 
Supreme Court ruling in the Bradwell case, heard about Miss 
Hulett's admittance, he was reputed to have said that if Miss Hulett 
were his daughter he would disinherit her.18 Justice Lawrence's 
39 
40 
words carried no weight; Myra Bradwell, through her own tenacity 
and the success of Alta M. Hulett, had finally won her case. 
The impact of the Bradwell case has less current relevance than 
Myra Bradwell herself. Although cases testing the Fourteenth 
Amendment have come before the Court many times since Myra 
Bradwell's case, and have expanded the interpretation of the 
Amendment, it was Mrs. Bradwell and not her case that influenced 
women's rights in Illinois. Her increasing involvement in the fight for 
women's rights led to changes in many unfair laws affecting women in 
this state; and it is because of women who followed her lead and 
fought as she had throughout this nation, that women today can enjoy 
the privileges so many of us take for granted. 
Today, women are entitled to privileges undreamed of in Mrs. 
Bradwell's lifetime. In light of the importance of the ERA 
amendment, spawned by the "Women's Movement" of the 1970's 
and 1980' s, the Bradwell case assumes more historical significance 
than it was previously accorded. Bradwell v. State of Illinois is an 
obscure case in the annals of jurisprudence, little known outside the 
study of Law; yet it is because of the Myra Bradwells of this country 
that modern women can stand beside men as equals. 
* Note: The discrepancies regarding the date of Bradwell v. State 
of Illinois in this paper have occurred because there were 
different dates presented as the correct date in various 
resources I used. In Reconstruction and Reunion 1864-88, 
Charles Fairman noted that occasionally such dates are 
inaccurate or incomplete. 
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